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Abstract
Federated learning aims to protect data privacy by collaboratively learning a model
without sharing private data among users. However, an adversary may still be
able to infer the private training data by attacking the released model. Differential
privacy(DP) provides a statistical guarantee against such attacks, at a privacy of
possibly degenerating the accuracy or utility of the trained models. In this pa-
per, we apply a utility enhancement scheme based on Laplacian smoothing for
differentially-private federated learning (DP-Fed-LS), where the parameter aggre-
gation with injected Gaussian noise is improved in statistical precision. We provide
tight closed-form privacy bounds for both uniform and Poisson subsampling and
derive corresponding DP guarantees for differential private federated learning, with
or without Laplacian smoothing. Experiments over MNIST, SVHN and Shake-
speare datasets show that the proposed method can improve model accuracy with
DP-guarantee under both subsampling mechanisms.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have already witnessed machine learning’s great success in handling large-scale
and high-dimension data [19, 41, 10, 37]. Most of these models are trained on centralized manner
by gathering all data into a single database. However, in fields like medical or financial research,
sensitive data are collected by different parties, like hospitals or banks, who are not willing to share
their own data with others. Firstly proposed in [25], federated learning provides such a solution
that data owners can collaboratively learn a useful ML model without disclosing their private data
[25, 22, 39, 38]. In federated learning, multiple data owners, referred as clients, and a server are
involved. In each communication round, the server will distribute the latest global model to a random
subset of selected clients (active clients), who will perform learning starting with the received global
model based on their private data, and then upload the locally updated models back to the server. The
server then aggregates these local models into a new global model and start another communication
round until convergence.
However, it is still not sufficient to protect the sensitive data by simply decoupling the model training
from the need for direct access to the raw training data [25], whose information will be revealed by
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the well-trained model. An adversary may infer the presence of particular records during training
[36] or even recover the face images in the training set [16, 17] by attacking the released model.
Differential privacy (DP) provides us a solution against the threats above [14, 11]. Differential privacy
guarantees privacy in a statistical way that the well-trained models are not sensitive to change of an
individual record in the training set. This task is usually fulfilled by adding noise to the outputs or
updates calibrated to the sensitivity of the model.
One major issue of differential privacy lies in its possibly significant degeneration of the utility of
trained models. Laplacian smoothing (LS) was recently shown to be a good choice for variance
reduction and escaping spurious minima in stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [31], and is thus
promising for utility improvement in differentially private learning [42].
In this paper, we investigate the differentially-private federated learning (DP-Fed) and charaterize its
privacy budget. Then we utilize Laplacian smoothing (DP-Fed-LS) to enhance the utility of training
while keeping the differential privacy. The major contributions of our works are:
• We provide tight closed-form privacy bounds for both uniform and Poisson subsampling,
which relax the requirements of previous works [43, 6, 29]. Based on these results, we
derive DP-guarantee for differential private federated learning, with or without Laplacian
smoothing.
• We demonstrate the efficiency of Laplacian smoothing in DP-Fed by training a logistic
regression over MNIST, a CNN over extended SVHN, in an IID fashion, and we also train
a LSTM over Shakespeare dataset in Non-IID setting. These experiments show that DP-
Fed-LS provides better utility than DP-Fed under different DP-guarantees and subsampling
mechanisms.
2 Related Work
One research topic on federated learning focuses on its security and data privacy. Generally speaking,
the attackers are in the lead by far. Federated learning increases the risk of privacy leakage by
unintentionally allowing malicious clients to participate in the training. Hitaj et al. [20] shows that an
adversary client can train a GAN to generate prototypical samples of the private training data owned
by other users, and deceive the victims to reveal more information. Melis et al. [27] demonstrate
that a curious client may infer the presence of exact data point, or some unintended properties of
other clients’ data through gradient exchange. Zhu et al. [49] show that it is possible to obtain the
private training data from the publicly shared gradients by optimization in distributed learning system.
Model poissoning attacks are also introduced in [3, 5]. Even though we can ensure the training is
private, the released model may also leak sensitive information about data. Fredrikson et al. [17, 16]
introduce the model inversion attack that can infer sensitive features or even recover the input given a
model. Membership inference attack can determine whether a record is in the training set by utilizing
the ubiquitous overfitting of machine learning models [36, 46, 35].
Simply decoupling the training from direct access to private data is not enough. Dwork et al. [14, 12]
consider output perturbation with noise whose standard deviation is calibrated according to the
sensitivity of the function. Chaudhuri et al. [8, 9] apply the output perturbation to empirical risk
minimization (ERM) and propose objective perturbation. Gradient perturbation [4, 1] receives lots
of attention in machine learning applications nowadays since it admits public training process and
ensure differential privacy guarantee even for non-convex objective [47]. Wang et al. [45] reveals
some intricate relationship between learnability, stability and privacy about ERM. Wang et al. [43]
further study privcay-preserving nonconvex ERM and extend it to multi-party computation. Feldman
et al. [15] argue that one can amplifies the privacy guarantee by not releasing the intermediate results
of contractive iterations. Papernot et al. [32, 33] propose PATE that bridges the target model and
training data by multiple teacher models. Mironov [28] proposes a natural relaxation of differential
privacy based on Rényi divergence (RDP), which allows tighter analysis of composite heterogeneous
mechanisms. Wang et al. [44] provide a tight upper bound on RDP parameters for algorithms that
apply a randomized mechanism with uniform subsampling. Furthermore, they extend their bound to
the case of Poisson subsampling [50], which derives the same numerical bound as the one in [29].
Differential privacy has already been applied in many distributed learning scenarios. Pathak et al. [34]
propose the first differentially-private training protocol in distributed setting. Jayaraman et al. [21]
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Algorithm 1 Differentially-Private Federated Learning with Laplacian Smoothing (DP-Fed-LS)
parameters:
activate client fraction τ ∈ (0, 1]
total communication round T
sensitivity parameter G
noise level ν
function CLIENTUPDATE(j, wt−1)
B ← (split dataset Sj into batches of size B)
for i=1 to local epoch E do
for b ∈ B do
wj
t ← wjt − ηt · 1B
∑
k∈b∇`(wjt; bk)
wj
t ← wt−1 + CLIP(wtj − wt−1)
end for
end for
return ∆tj ← wjt − wt−1
function CLIP(v, G)
return v/max(1, ‖v‖2/G)
Server executes:
initialize w0
for t = 1 to T do
Mt← (random subset of m clients selected
by uniform or Possion subsampling with ra-
tio τ )
for client j ∈Mt in parallel do
∆tj ← CLIENTUPDATE(j, wt−1)
end for
∆t ← 1mA−1σ (
∑m
j=1 ∆
t
j +N (0, ν2I))
wt ← wt−1 + ∆t
end for
Output wT
reduce the noise needed in [34] by a factor of m by adding the noise inside the secure computation
after aggregation . Zhang et al. [48] propose to decouple the feature extraction from the training
process, where clients only need to extract features with frozen pre-trained convolutional layers
and perturb them with Laplacian noise. However, this method need to introduce extra edge servers
besides the center server in standard federated learning. Agarwal et al. [2] take both communication
efficiency and privacy into consideration. They derive a new Binomial Mechanism to accommodate
to their gradient quantization for communication efficiency. Truex et al. [40] argue that leveraging
secure multiparty computation (SMC) can help reduce the noise needed by differential privacy, and
they introduce a tunable trust parameter which accounts for various trust scenarios. Geyer et al. [18]
and McMahan et al. [26] consider the similar problem setting as this paper, that is applying Gaussian
Mechanism in federated learning to ensure differential privacy. Mcmahan el al. [24] use moment
accountant in [29, 24], which is a strengthened version of the one in [1] through the notation of Rényi
differential privacy (RDP).
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we formulate the basic scheme of private (noisy) federated learning and set the
notations for the rest of this paper. Given K clients and the latest model wt−1, the server will
randomly select a subset of active clients with or without replacement with subsampling ratio τ to
participate in the t-th communication round. In such a communication round, the selected clients
will receive the global model wt−1, then perform mini-batch SGD on its own data with a batch size
of B for E epochs, and send back the new locally-trained models wtjs to the sever. The sever will
aggregate them into the latest global model wt, and start the next communication round. We call that
a setting is IID if data of each client are sampled from the same distribution, otherwise we call it
Non-IID.
In each update of the mini-batch SGD, we bound to local model wtj within the G-ball centering
around wt−1 by clipping: clip(v)← v/max(1, ‖v‖2/G), where G is the sensitivity of the update.
In each server update, we regards the aggregation of locally-trained models as gradient, where we
add calibrated Gaussian noise n ∼ N (0, ν2I) to induce the differetnial privacy. We denote this
algorithm as DP-Fed. Furthermore, we apply Laplacian smoothing with smoothing factor σ on
the noisy aggregated gradient, to stabilize the training while preserving the differential privacy by
post-processing theorem. We denote this algorithm as DP-Fed-LS. The detailed implementation of
DP-Fed-LS is summarized in Algorithm 1.
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4 Methodology
Here we introduce our main methodology, Private Federated Learning with Laplaician Smoothing
(DP-Fed-LS). Consider the following stochastic optimization process
wk+1 = wk − ηA−1σ ∇fi(wk), (1)
where fi(w)
.
= f(w,xi, yi) is the loss of a given ML model on the training data {xi, yi}, η is the
learning rate, and i is a random sample from [n]. In Laplacian smoothing [31], we let Aσ = I+ σL
where L ∈ Bd×d is a 1-dimensional chain graph Laplacian matrix, i.e. a symmetric matrix Aσ
whose diagonal elements Aσ(i, i) = 1 + 2σ, off diagonal Aσ(i, i+ 1) = −σ (i 6= j), and otherwise
0, for some constant σ ≥ 0.
When σ = 0, Laplacian smoothing gradient descent reduces to SGD. The motivation behind this
Laplacian smoothing lies in that when the target parameter v˜ is contaminated by Gaussian noise,
v˜ = v + n, v ∈ Rd,n ∼ N (0, ν2I),
a smooth approximation of v˜ is helpful to reduce the noise. The Laplacian smoothed estimate
vˆLS := arg min
u
‖u− v˜‖2 + σ‖∇u‖2,
where ∇ is a 1-dimensional gradient operator, satisfies the following linear equation
Aσ vˆLS = v˜ = v + n.
The following proposition characterizes the prediction error of Laplacian smoothed estimate vˆLS .
Proposition 1. Let the graph Laplacian have eigen-decomposition ∆ei = λiei with eigenvalues
0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λd and the first eigenvector e1 = 1/
√
d. Then the risk of estimate vˆLS admits
the following decomposition,
E‖vˆLS − v‖2 = ‖(I −A†σ)v‖2 +E‖A†σn‖2
=
∑
i
σ2λ2i
(1 + σλi)2
〈v, ei〉2 +
∑
i
ν2
(1 + σλi)2
,
where the first part is called the bias and the second part is called the variance.
In the bias-variance decomposition of the risk above, if σ = 0, the risk becomes bias-free with
variance dν2; if σ > 0, bias is introduced while variance is reduced. The optimal choice of σ must
depend on an optimal trade-off between the bias and variance in this case. When the true parameter v
is smooth, in the sense that its projections 〈v, ei〉 → 0 rapidly as i increases, the introduction of bias
can be much smaller compared to the reduction of variance, hence the total risk can be reduced with
Laplacian smoothing. In Figure 1, we demonstrate an example where Laplacian smoothing reaches
improved estimates of smooth signals (parameters) against Gaussian noise.
Among a variety of usages such that reducing the variance of SGD on-the-fly, escaping spurious
minima, and improving generalization in training many machine learning models including neural
networks, the Laplacian smoothing in this paper improves the utility when Gaussian noise is injected
to federated learning for privacy.
Computationally, we use the fast Fourier transform (FFT) to perform gradient smoothing in the
following way
A−1σ v = ifft
( fft(v)
1− σ · fft(d)
)
, (2)
where v is any stochastic gradient vector and d = [−2, 1, 0, ..., 0, 1]T .
5 Differential Privacy Guarantees
In this section, we provide closed-form differential privacy guarantees for DP-Fed-LS, under both
scenarios that activate clients are sampled with uniform subsampling or with Poisson subsampling.
Let us recall the definition of (Rényi) differential privacy.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Demonstration of Laplacian smoothing. We try to use a linear classifier y = sigmoid(Wx)
to separate data points from two distributions, i.e., the blue points (y = 0) and the green points
(y = 1) in (a). We use gradient descent (GD) and Laplacian smoothing gradient descent (LSGD with
σ = 1) with binary cross entropy loss to fulfill this task. Here W is intialized as (0,0) and its perfect
solution would be (c,c) for any c < 0. Gaussian noise with standard deviation of 0.3 is added on the
gradients. Learning rate is set to be 0.1. In (b), we plot the evolution curves of W in 100 updates,
where we can find that the curve of LSGD is much smoother than the one of GD.
Definition 1 ((,δ)-DP [13]). A randomized mechanismM : SN → R satisfies (,δ)-differential
privacy if for any two adjacent data sets S, S′ ∈ SN differing by only one element, and any output
subset O ⊆ R, it holds that
P[M(S) ∈ O] ≤ e · P[M(S′) ∈ O] + δ
.
Definition 2 (RDP [28]). For α > 1 and ρ > 0, a randomized mechanismM : Sn → R satisfies
(α, ρ)-Rényi differential privacy, i.e., (α, ρ)-RDP, if for all adjacent datasets S, S′ ∈ Sn differing by
one element, we have
Dα
(M(S)||M(S′)) := 1
α− 1 log
(M(S)
M(S′)
)α
≤ ρ,
where the expectation is taken overM(S′).
Lemma 1 (From RDP to (, δ)-DP [28]). If a randomized mechanism M : Sn → R satisfies
(α, ρ)-RDP, thenM satisfies (ρ+ log(1/δ)/(α− 1), δ)-DP for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
Firstly, we consider the case where active clients are selected by uniform subsampling, i.e, in each
communication round, a subset of fixed size m = K · τ of clients are sampled.
Lemma 2 (Uniform Subsampling). Gaussian mechanismM = f(S)+N (0, ν2) applied on a subset
of samples that are drawn uniformly without replacement with probability τ satisfies (α, 3.5τ2α/ν2)-
RDP given ν2 ≥ 0.67 and α− 1 ≤ 23ν2 ln
(
1/ατ(1 + ν2)
)
, where the sensitivity of f is 1.
Remark 1. Comparing with the result (α, 5τ2α/ν2) in [43], and (α, 6τ2α/ν2) in [6], Lemma 2
provides a tighter bound while relaxing their requirement on ν2 that ν2 ≥ 1.5 and ν2 ≥ 5 respectively.
Theorem 1 (Differential Privacy Guarantee For DP-Fed-LS with Uniform Subsampling). For any
δ ∈ (0, 1), , DP-Fed or DP-Fed-LS sampling uniformly without replacement, satisfies (,δ)-DP when
its injected Gaussian noise N (0, ν2) is chosen to be
ν ≥ τG

√
14T
λ
(
log(1/δ)
1− λ + 
)
, (3)
if there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that ν2/4G2 ≥ 0.67 and α − 1 ≤ ν26G2 log(1/(τα(1 + ν2/4G2))),
where α = log(1/δ)/(1− λ)+ 1, G is the `2-bound of clipping map on gradient, τ := m/K is the
subsampling ratio of active clients, T is the total number of communication rounds.
Instead of constructing a subset of active clients of fixed size m = τ ·K uniformly, one can consider
Poisson subsampling that includes each clients in the subset with probability τ independently. If
we trace back to the definition, this substle difference actually comes from the difference of how
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we construct the adjacent dataset S and S ′. For uniform subsampling, S and S ′ are adjacent if and
only if there exist two samples a ∈ S and b ∈ S ′ such that if we replace a in S with b, then S is
identical with S ′ [13]. However, for Poisson subsampling, S and S ′ are said to be adjacent if S ∪{a}
or S\{a} is identical to S ′ for some sample a [29, 50]. This minor difference actually leads to two
different parallel scenarios. The results regarding Poisson subsampling are shown in the following.
Lemma 3 (Poisson Subsampling). Gaussian mechanismM = f(S) +N (0, ν2) applied on a subset
of samples that are drawn uniformly without replacement with probability τ satisfies (α, 2τ2α/ν2)-
RDP given ν2 ≥ 0.53 and α− 1 ≤ 23ν2 log
(
1/ατ(1 + ν2)
)
, where the sensitivity of f is 1.
Remark 2. Lemma 3’s bound equals the boubd in (α, 2ατ2/ν2)-DP in [29]. However, we relax the
requirement that ν ≥ 4, and simplify multiples requirements over α that 1 < α ≤ ν2L2 − 2 ln ν and
α ≤ ν2L2/2−ln 5−2 ln νL+ln(τα)+1/(2ν2) . where L = ln
(
1 + 1τ(α−1)
)
, to one requirement. This makes our closed-form
privacy bound below more concise and easily implemented.
Theorem 2 (Differential Privacy Guarantee For DP-Fed-LS with Poisson Subsampling). For any
δ ∈ (0, 1), , DP-Fed or DP-Fed-LS sampling independently with probability τ , satisfies (,δ)-DP
when its injected Gaussian noise N (0, ν2) is chosen to be
ν ≥ τG

√
8T
λ
(
log(1/δ)
1− λ + 
)
, (4)
if there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that ν2/4G2 ≥ 0.53 and α − 1 ≤ ν26G2 log(1/(τα(1 + ν2/4G2))),
where α = log(1/δ)/(1− λ)+ 1, G is the `2-bound of clipping map on gradient, τ := m/K is the
subsampling ratio of active clients, T is the total number of communication rounds.
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate DP-Fed-LS on three classification tasks. For all three tasks, we compare
the utility of DP-Fed-LS (σ > 0) and DP-Fed (σ = 0) with varying  in (, δ)-DP, where δ = 1/K1.1
[26]. These three tasks include training differentially-private federated logistic regression on MNIST
dataset [23], CNN on SVHN dataset [30] and LSTM over the Shakespeare dataset [7, 25]. Details
about datasets and tasks will be discussed in the corresponding subsections. For logistic regression,
we apply the privacy budget in Theorem 1 and 2. For CNN and LSTM models, we apply the moment
accountants in [44] and [50, 29] for uniform subsampling and Poisson subsampling, respectively. We
report the average loss and average accuracy based on 3 independent runs.
6.1 Logistic Regression
We train a differentially-private federated logistic regression on MNIST dataset [23]. MNIST is a
dataset of 28×28 grayscale images of digit from 0 to 9, containing 60K training samples and 10K
testing samples. We split 50K training samples into 1000 clients each containing 50 examples in an
IID fashion [25]. The remaining 10K training samples are left for validation. We set the batch size
B = 10, local epoch E = 5, sensitivity G = 0.3, number of communication round T = 30, activate
client fraction τ = 0.05 and weight decay λ = 4e− 5. We use a initial local learning rate η = 1e− 2
and decay it by a factor of γ = 0.99 each communication round.
We notice that DP-Fed-LS outperforms DP-Fed in all the settings. And the gap between DP-Fed-LS
and DP-Fed is relatively large when the epsilon is small. We notice that DP-Fed-LS converges slower
than DP-Fed in both subsampling scenarios. However, DP-Fed-LS will generalize better than DP-Fed
at the later stage of training.
6.2 Convolutional Neural Network
In this section, we train a differentially-private federated CNN on the extended SVHN dataset [30].
SVHN is a dataset of 32×32 colored images of digits from 0 to 9, containing 73,257 trainiing samples
and 26,032 testing samples. We enlarge the training set with another 531,131 extended samples
and split them into 2,000 clients each containing about 300 examples in an IID fashion [25]. We
also split the testing set by 10K/16K for validation and testing respectively. Our CNNs stacks two
5 × 5 convolutional layers with max-pooling, two fully-connected layers with 384 and 192 units
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Table 1: Testing accuracy of logistic on MNIST with DP-Fed(σ = 0) and DP-Fed-LS(σ = 1, 2, 3)
under different (, 1/10001.1)-DP guarantees and subsampling mechanisms.
Uniform Subsampling Poisson Subsampling
 6 7 8 9  6 7 8 9
σ = 0 78.41 81.85 83.24 84.62 σ = 0 80.46 83.10 83.60 84.39
σ = 1 82.44 85.12 85.22 84.69 σ = 1 82.60 84.16 84.32 84.98
σ = 2 83.33 84.65 85.31 85.27 σ = 2 83.83 85.15 85.35 85.25
σ = 3 83.60 83.53 85.18 85.35 σ = 3 84.26 84.29 85.34 85.17
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Training curves of logistic regression on MNIST with DP-Fed(σ = 0), DP-Fed-LS(σ =
1, 2, 3). (a), (b): validation loss and accuracy with uniform subsampling and (7, 1/10001.1)-DP (c),
(d): validation loss and accuracy with Poisson subsampling and (7, 1/10001.1)-DP.
.
respectively, and a final softmax output layer (about 3.4M parameters in total) [32]. For both the
uniform or Poisson subsampling scenarios, we use the same parameter settings. We set the batch
size B = 50, local epoch E = 10, sensitivity G = 0.7, number of communication round T = 200,
activate client fraction τ = 0.05 and weight decay λ = 4e− 5. Initial learning rate η = 0.1 and will
decay by a factor of γ = 0.99 each communication round. We vary the privacy budget by setting the
noise multiplier z=1, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5.
Table 2: Testing accuracy of CNN on SVHN with DP-Fed(σ = 0) and DP-Fed-LS(σ = 0, 5, 1, 1.5)
under different (, 1/20001.1)-DP guarantees and subsampling mechanisms.
Uniform Subsampling Poisson Subsampling
 5.23 6.34 7.84 8.66  2.56 3.19 4.24 5.07
σ = 0.0 81.40 82.46 85.18 85.84 σ = 0.0 82.29 83.82 85.53 86.56
σ = 0.5 82.72 84.65 86.49 86.32 σ = 0.5 84.27 85.47 87.00 87.50
σ = 1.0 82.39 84.13 85.88 86.39 σ = 1.0 84.65 85.38 86.37 87.26
σ = 1.5 82.19 83.97 86.03 85.66 σ = 1.5 84.23 85.12 86.58 87.35
In Table 2, we report the average testing accuracy over 3 independent runs. It demonstrates that
DP-Fed-LS yields higher accuracy than DP-Fed with both subsampling mechanisms and different
DP guarantees. We show the training curves in Figure 3, which are similar to the ones of logistic
regression. The training curves of DP-Fed-LS converges slower than that of DP-Fed, especially when
uniform subsampling is used. However, DP-Fed-LS can still provide a better results than DP-Fed at
the later stage.
In Figure 4, we show the training curves where relatively large noise multipliers are applied with
Possion subsampling and different learning rate. When the noise level is large, the training curves
fluctuate a lot. We can observe that, in these extreme cases, DP-Fed-LS outperforms DP-Fed by a
large margin. In some cases, for example, when z = 3 and η = 0.5, validation accuracy of DP-Fed
start to drop at the 150th epoch while DP-Fed-LS can still converges. When the learning rate increase
to 0.125, validation accuracy of DP-Fed drops below 0.2 after the 25th epoch while DP-Fed-LS
approach 0.7 at the end. Overall speaking, DP-Fed-LS can suffer large noise level and is less sensitive
to learning rate.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Training curves of CNN on SVHN with DP-Fed(σ = 0), DP-Fed-LS(σ = 0.5, 1, 1.5). (a),
(b): validation loss and accuracy with uniform subsampling, where (5.23, 1/20001.1)-DP is applied.
(c), (d): validation loss and accuracy with Poisson subsampling, where (5.07, 1/20001.1)-DP is
applied.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Training curves of CNN on SVHN where large noise levels are applied, with Poisson
subsampling and different learning rates η. From left tor right, noise multiplier z = 2, 2.5 and 3. For
DP-Fed-LS, we set σ = 1. We can find that DP-Fed-LS is less sensitive to large noise and the change
of learning rates than DP-SGD.
6.3 Long Short Term Memory Network
In this section, we train a differentially-private LSTM on Shakespeare dataset [7, 25]. Shakespeare
dataset is built from all the works of William Shakespeare, where each speaking role is consider as a
client, whose local database consists of all her/his lines, which will be a Non-IID setting. The full
dataset contains 1,129 clients and 4,226,158 samples. Here, each sample consists of 80 successive
characters and the task is to predict the next character [7, 25]. In our setting, we remove the clients
owning less than 64 samples for stabilizing the training, which reduces the total client number to
975. We split the training, validation and testing set chronologically [7, 25], with fractions of 0.7,
0.1, 0.2, respectively. Our LSTM model firstly embeds each input character into a 8 dimensional
space, after which two LSTM layers are stacked, each having 256 nodes. The outputs will be then
fed into a linear layer, of which the number of output nodes equal the number of distinct characters
[25]. In this experiment, we set batch size B = 50, local epoch E = 5, sensitivity G = 5, number
of communication round T = 100, activate client fraction τ = 0.2 and weight decay λ = 4e − 5.
Initial learning rate η = 1.47 [25] and will decay by a factor γ = 0.99 each communication round.
We vary the privacy budget by setting the noise multiplier z = 1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6.
Table 3: Testing accuracy of LSTM on Shakespeare with DP-Fed(σ = 0) and DP-Fed-LS(σ =
0, 5, 1, 1.5) under different (, 1/9751.1)-DP guarantees and subsampling mechanisms.
Uniform Subsampling Poisson Subsampling
 14.94 17.69 22.43 27.24  6.78 8.22 10.41 14.04
σ = 0.0 38.22 38.47 39.96 41.87 σ = 0.0 38.81 39.42 40.19 41.55
σ = 0.5 39.14 40.27 41.95 43.76 σ = 0.5 39.07 40.02 42.02 43.59
σ = 1.0 39.18 40.94 42.60 43.90 σ = 1.0 39.45 41.07 42.09 43.78
σ = 1.5 40.16 40.89 42.50 43.95 σ = 1.5 39.38 40.99 42.19 43.67
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The testing accuracy in Table 3 are comparable to the one in [7]. We can also conclude that DP-
Fed-LS provides better utility than DP-Fed. The training curves are plotted in Figure 5. Generally
speaking, the training curves in Non-IID setting suffer from larger fluctuation than the ones in IID
setting we show above. And the curves of DP-Fed-LS are smoother than DP-Fed, which further
demonstrates the potential of DP-Fed-LS in real-world applications.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: Training curves of LSTM on Shakespeare with DP-Fed(σ = 0), DP-Fed-LS(σ =
0.5, 1, 1.5). (a), (b): validation loss and accuracy with uniform subsampling, where (27.24, 1/9751.1)-
DP is applied. (c), (d): validation loss and accuracy with Poisson subsampling, where
(14.04, 1/9751.1)-DP is applied.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce DP-Fed-LS and prove tight closed-form privacy guarantees regrading this
algorithm under uniform or Poisson subsampling mechanisms. We show by several experiments that
DP-Fed-LS outperforms DP-Fed in both IID and Non-IID settings, which demonstrates its potential
in practical applications.
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A Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. This proof basically follows the one of Lemma 3.7 of [43], while we relax their requirement
and get a tighter bound. According to Theorem 9 in [44], Gaussian mechanism applied on a subset of
size m = τ ·K, whose samples are drawn uniformly satisfies (α, ρ′)-RDP, where
ρ′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + τ2
(
α
2
)
min
{
4(eρ(2) − 1), 2eρ(2)
}
+
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e(j−1)ρ(j)
)
where ρ(j) = j/2ν2. As mentioned in [44], the dominant part in the summation on the right hand
side arises from the term min
{
4(eρ(2) − 1), 2eρ(2)} when ν2 is relatively large. We will bound this
term as a whole instead of bounding it firstly by 4(eρ(2) − 1) [43]. For ν2 ≥ 0.67, we have
min
{
4(eρ(2) − 1), 2eρ(2)
}
= min
{
4(e1/ν
2 − 1), 2e1/ν2
}
≤ 6/ν2, (5)
which can be prove by numerical comparison shown in Figure 6.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Numerical comparison of Eq. (5). In (a), we demonstrate the min
{
4(e1/ν
2−1), 2e1/ν2} ≤
6/ν2 when ν2 ≥ 0.67. In (b), we zoom in the range where ν ∈ [1.1, 1.7] of (a).
For the term summing from j = 3 to α, we have
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e(j−1)ρ(j) =
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e
(j−1)j
2ν2 ≤
α∑
j=3
τ j
αj
j!
2e
(j−1)j
2ν2
≤
α∑
j=3
τ j
αj
3!
2e
(α−1)j
2ν2 = τ2
α2
3
α∑
j=3
τ j−2αj−2e
(α−1)j
2ν2
≤ τ2
(
α
2
) α∑
j=3
τ j−2αj−2e
(α−1)j
2ν2
≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
ταe
3(α−1)
2ν2
1− ταeα−12ν2
≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
ταe
3(α−1)
2ν2
1− ταe 3(α−1)2ν2
(6)
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where the first inequality follows from the the fact that
(
α
j
) ≤ αjj! , and the last inequality follows
from the condition that τα exp (α− 1)/(2ν2) < 1. In this case, given that
α− 1 ≤ 2
3
ν2 ln
1
τα(1 + ν2)
, (7)
we have
α∑
j=3
τ j
(
α
j
)
2e(j−1)ρ(j) ≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
1
ν2
(8)
Combining the results in Eq. (5) and Eq. (8), we have
ρ′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 +
(
α
2
)
6τ2
ν2
+
(
α
2
)
τ2
ν2
)
≤ 1
α− 1τ
2
(
α
2
)
7
ν2
= 3.5ατ2/ν2.
And conditon τα exp (α− 1)/(2ν2) < 1 directly follows from Eq.(7).
B Proof of Theorem 1
We firstly introduce the notation of `2-sensitivity and composition theorem of RDP.
Definition 3 (`2-Sensitivity). For any given function f(·), the `2-sensitivity of f is defined by
∆(f) = max
‖S−S′‖1=1
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖2,
where ‖S − S′‖1 = 1 means the data sets S and S′ differ in only one entry.
Lemma 4 (Composition Theorem of RDP [28]). If k randomized mechanismsMi : Sn → R, for
i ∈ [k], satisfy (α, ρi)-RDP, then their composition
(M1(S), . . . ,Mk(S)) satisfies (α,∑ki=1 ρi)-
RDP. Moreover, the input of the i-th mechanism can be based on outputs of the previous (i − 1)
mechanisms.
Here we are going to provide privacy upper bound for FedAvg with SGD,
wt+1 = wt +
1
m
( ∑
j∈Mt
wtj −m ·wt + n
)
, (9)
and with LSSGD,
w˜t+1 = w˜t +
1
m
A−1σ
( ∑
j∈Mt
w˜tj −m · w˜t + n
)
, (10)
where n ∼ N (0, ν2I), and wtj is the updated model from client j, based on the previous global
model wt.
Proof. In the following, we will show that the Gaussian noiseN (0, ν2) in Eq. (9) for each coordinate
of n, the output of DPFed-SGD, w, after T iteration is (,δ)-DP.
Let us consider the mechanismMt = 1m
∑K
j=1w
t
j−wt+ 1mnwith the query qt = 1m
∑K
j=1w
t
j−wt
and its subsampled version Mˆt = 1m
∑
j∈Mt w
t
j −wt + 1mn. Define the query noise nq = n/m
whose variance is ν2q := ν
2/m2.
We will firstly evaluate the sensitivity of wtj . For each local iteration
wj
t ← wjt − ηt · 1
B
∑
i∈b
∇`(wjt; bi)
wj
t ← wt−1 + clip(wtj −wt−1),
13
where clip(v) ← v/max(1, ‖v‖2/G). All the local output ∆tj ← wtj − wt−1 will be inside the
l2-norm ball centering around wt−1 with radius G. Therefore, after local iterations,
‖wtj −wt
′
j ‖ ≤ 2G.
We have l2-sensitivity of qt as ∆q = ‖wtj −wt
′
j ‖2/m ≤ 2G/m.
According to [28], if we add noise with variance,
ν2 = m2ν2q =
14τ2αTG2
λ
, (11)
the mechanismMt will satisfy (α, α∆2(q)/(2ν2q )) = (α, λ/7τ2T )-RDP. According to Lemma 2,
Mˆt will satisfy (α,λ/T )-RDP provided that ν2q/∆2(q) = ν2/(m2∆2(q)) ≥ 0.67 and α − 1 ≤
2ν2q
3∆2(q) log
(
1/τα(1+ν2q/∆
2(q))
)
. By post-processing theorem, M˜t = A−1σ
(
1
m
∑
j∈Mt w
t
j−wt+
1
mn
)
will also satisfy (α, λ/T )-RDP.
Let α = log(1/δ)/(1−λ)+1, we obtain that Mˆt (and M˜t) satisfies (log(1/δ)/(1−λ)+1, λ/T )-
RDP as long as we have
ν2q
∆2(q)
=
ν2
m2∆2(q)
=
ν2
4G2
≥ 0.67 (12)
and
α− 1 ≤ ν
2
6G2
ln
1
τα(1 + ν2/4G2)
, (13)
Therefore, according to Lemma 4, we have wt (and w˜t) satisfies (log(1/δ)/(1− λ)+ 1, λt/T )-
RDP. Finally, by Lemma 1, we have wt (and w˜t) satisfies (λt/T + (1−λ), δ)-DP. Thus, the output
of DP-Fed (and DP-Fed-LS), w (and w˜), is (,δ)-DP.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. According to [29, 50], Gaussian mechanism applied on a subset where samples are included
into the subset with probability ratio τ independently satifies (α, ρ′)-RDP, where
ρ′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
(ατ−τ+1)(1−τ)α−1+
(
α
2
)
(1−τ)α−2τ2eρ(2)+
α∑
j=3
(
α
j
)
(1−τ)α−jτ je(j−1)ρ(j)
)
where ρ(j) = j/2ν2.
We notice that, when σ is relatively large, the sum in right-hand side will be dominated by the first
two terms. For the first term, we have
(ατ − τ + 1)(1− τ)α−1 ≤ ατ − τ + 1
1 + (α− 1)τ = 1, (14)
where the first inequality follows from the inequality that
(1 + x)n ≤ 1
1− nx for x ∈ [−1, 0], n ∈ N.
And for the second term, we have
τ2
(
α
2
)
(1− τ)α−2e 1ν2 ≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
e
1
ν2 ≤ τ2
(
α
2
)
7
2ν2
(15)
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given that ν2 ≥ 0.53. The last inequality can be proved by numerical comparison like the one we did
in the proof of Lemma 2.
And the summation from j = 3 to α follows Eq. (8) given that
α− 1 ≤ 2
3
ν2 ln
1
τα(1 + ν2)
. (16)
Combining Eq. (14), (15) and (8), we have
ρ′(α) ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + τ2
(
α
2
)
7
2ν2
+ τ2
(
α
2
)
1
2ν2
)
≤ τ2α 4
2ν2
= 2ατ2/ν2. (17)
D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof is actually identical to proof of Theorem 1 except that we use Lemma 3 instead of
Lemma 2. We start from the Eq. (11) in the proof of Theorem 1. If we add noise with variance
ν2 = m2ν2q =
8τ2αTG2
λ
, (18)
the mechanismMt will satisfy (α, α∆2(q)/(2ν2q )) = (α, λ/4τ2T )-RDP. According to Lemma 3,
Mˆt will satisfy (α,λ/T )-RDP provided that ν2q/∆2(q) = ν2/(m2∆2(q)) ≥ 0.43
and
α− 1 ≤ ν
2
6G2
ln
1
τα(1 + ν2/4G2)
. (19)
By post-processing theorem, M˜t = A−1σ
(
1
m
∑
j∈Mt w
t
j−wt+ 1mn
)
will also satisfy (α, λ/T )-RDP.
Let α = log(1/δ)/(1−λ)+1, we obtain that Mˆt (and M˜t) satisfies (log(1/δ)/(1−λ)+1, λ/T )-
RDP. Therefore, according to Lemma 4, we havewt (and w˜t) satisfies (log(1/δ)/(1−λ)+1, λt/T )-
RDP. Finally, by Lemma 1, we have wt (and w˜t) satisfies (λt/T + (1−λ), δ)-DP. Thus, the output
of DP-Fed (and DP-Fed-LS), w (and w˜), is (,δ)-DP.
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